The big question

The Russia-Ukraine conflict

cracked concrete wall with painted eu, russia and ukraine flags

Image: MasterSergeant/Adobe Stock

Image: MasterSergeant/Adobe Stock

What is fuelling the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and what does it mean for Australia?


*Amendments were made to this story on 24 February 2022 at 4pm following the Russian declaration of a special military operation in Ukraine and reports of Russian troops entering Ukrainian territory.

As Russia officially enters Ukraine, the world is on edge – not for the first time – about what a Russian invasion means, both for Ukraine and for the broader balance of international security.

At the core of the situation are questions about cultural identity, history, and power. To understand more about what is happening, Contact asked UQ experts: what is fuelling the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and what does it mean for Australia?

A headshot of a man wearing glasses smiling into the camera. You can only see part of his shoulders, he is wearing a blue shirt.

Professor Christian Reus-Smit
School of Political Science and International Studies

At the root of the current Ukrainian crisis is a clash between old and new principles of international security.

Until the Cold War concluded, European security was – for centuries – based on balancing Great Powers, their right to distinct spheres of influence (usually in vulnerable border regions) and the development of fluid alliance systems.

The 1989 ‘Velvet Revolutions’ in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed everything. The victorious West abandoned the old ideas that peace depended on an ‘equilibrium’ of power, championing widespread democracy as the key to international security and putting faith in the stabilising role of international institutions and law.

A black-and-white photo designed to look torn. A huge crowd of people are facing in one direction. There are some unreadable signs being held in the background.

Prague during the 1989 Velvet Revolutions. Image: ŠJů/Wikicommons

Prague during the 1989 Velvet Revolutions. Image: ŠJů/Wikicommons

By entering Ukraine, Russia is fundamentally pursuing a return to old principles of international security in Europe. With a traumatic history of repelling Western invasions, Russia has long asserted its right to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

Russia’s actions are exacerbated by other factors. Significant sectors of Russia’s populace believe past imperial glory needs recovering. Further, as Putin’s authoritarianism hollows out Russia’s nascent democratic institutions, democratising border states (like Ukraine) are seen as a challenge.

The situation poses a profound challenge for the US and its European allies. It has rapidly reacquainted them with old-style ‘balance of power’ politics, forcing NATO back to its Cold War mission of collective defence. Immediately, this involves mustering all resources to respond to Russian aggression, but later, may well mean containing a protracted war within Ukraine while bolstering defences of Eastern European allies.

A designed photograph altered to look torn. The image is black-and-white; roughly 12 men stand around a heavy wooden desk, where one man is sitting down and signing a paper.

US President Truman implementing the North Atlantic Treaty at his desk in the Oval Office in 1949 as a number of dignitaries look on. NATO was formed as a 'collective security' mechanism, meaning that in the instance of an external attack on one member, all members are expected to provide defence support.

US President Truman implementing the North Atlantic Treaty at his desk in the Oval Office in 1949 as a number of dignitaries look on. NATO was formed as a 'collective security' mechanism, meaning that in the instance of an external attack on one member, all members are expected to provide defence support.

There is a deeper challenge, however. History shows that peace in Europe depends on leading states agreeing on common principles of security governance. No such agreement exists between NATO powers and Russia, and the current clash between old and new is dangerous and unsustainable.

The implications for Australia and the Asia-Pacific region cannot be overstated. There are worries of Australia being drawn into a European conflict, and that if the US and its NATO allies are unable to deter Russian aggression, China may be emboldened in its efforts to reintegrate Taiwan.

The most significant implication is for security governance. While security politics of Europe and the Asia-Pacific are different, they share a dangerous lack of agreed principles of governance, and very worryingly, there is little evidence of new thinking and serious diplomacy needed to define and uphold such principles.

A circle portrain of a woman smiling into the camera. She has light eyes and blonde hair, she is wearing a black v-neck shirt.

Dr Lauren Sanders
TC Beirne School of Law

With Russia's 'special military operation' in Ukraine, the movement of their troops into Ukrainian territory, accompanied by a declaration of war and claims to recognise previous autonomous regions in Ukraine as new states by Russia, it would be lawful for other States to act in Ukraine's collective self-defence using military force. 

Russia's actions amount to an egregious breach of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and justify the resort to force by Ukraine to defend itself – and those who wish to defend it – despite Putin's calls for Ukrainians to lay down their arms.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter establishes the basic international legal principle that countries are entitled to their sovereign integrity without threat of, or actual invasion, by other countries. The threshold for giving rise to a right of self defence by a state under international law is that of imminence or an actual attack. With Russian forces in Ukrainian territory, and clear declaration of an intent to conduct military operations, this threshold has been well surpassed. 

Claims by Russia of operations under the guise of 'demilitarisation and denazification' do not justify the use of force by Russia. Despite Russia’s claims that the troops stationed in Ukraine are there as peacekeepers, in response to what was styled by Russia as a lawful act of self-determination by the people in that region, this is a hollow effort at legitimacy on Russia’s behalf. 

The flagrant disregard for the current international rules-based order by Russia is being met with crisis talks and strongly worded appeals by the United Nations Secretary-General, as well as a draft United Nations Security Council Resolution denouncing Russia’s action for being inconsistent with international law and the 2015 Minsk agreement. With Ukraine not being a member of NATO, the US and other NATO members are not bound by any treaty obligation to respond with force to this invasion. However, US President Biden suggested that the NATO alliance will respond to this act of aggression by Putin, as the US appears to plan a defence of Ukraine through greater sanctions against Russia.  

Although Russia’s position as a permanent member of the UN with a veto power thwarts any Security Council action, other options, relying upon consensus action by the General Assembly, could result in UN sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter, or even authorise a UN mandate for other states to deploy military forces in response. 

Despite the current failures of diplomacy, and the failure of the Minsk agreement, there are still options for greater pressure to be placed upon Russia to halt its unlawful actions, without resorting to force and further escalation of conflict.

For Australia, further ratcheting up of unilateral sanctions against Russia, such as freezing assets of more Russian citizens, and expanding the provision of military assistance (in addition to the current provision of cyber experts to aid the Ukrainian military), remain options to demonstrate that Russia’s actions will not be tolerated. This would be in hopes of preventing further conflict and violence that will ultimately have the greatest impact upon the civilians of Ukraine.

Flags outside the United Nations in New York, United States. Image: Andrew Kazmierski

A row of bright flags from dozens of different countries on flag poles. There are sky scrapers in the background.
A circle portrait of a woman smiling into the camera. She has dark hair and eyes.

Associate Professor Marianne Hanson
School of Political Science and International Studies

In 1990, as the Cold War was ending, the US, Britain and other members of NATO – the military alliance formed explicitly against the USSR – gave multiple reassurances to Moscow that NATO would not expand eastwards. These assurances were given in order to allow for German reunification in 1990.

Moscow was always uneasy about this, but agreed that German unification – and German membership of NATO could go ahead – as long as NATO would not expand any further eastwards.

An image designed to look like a torn photograph. In the photograph, there is a tall, graffitied wall, with people standing both beside and on top of the wall. Someone on top of the wall is lifting someone from below up.

People atop the Berlin Wall near the Brandenburg Gate on 9 November 1989 as part of German reunification. The text on the sign "Achtung! Sie verlassen jetzt West-Berlin" ("Notice! You are now leaving West Berlin") has been modified with an additional text "Wie denn?" ("How?"). Image: Sue Ream/Wikicommons

People atop the Berlin Wall near the Brandenburg Gate on 9 November 1989 as part of German reunification. The text on the sign "Achtung! Sie verlassen jetzt West-Berlin" ("Notice! You are now leaving West Berlin") has been modified with an additional text "Wie denn?" ("How?"). Image: Sue Ream/Wikicommons

The West – and especially the US – broke this promise. In 1999 they brought Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia into NATO, and in 2004, several other former Soviet republics and former allies also joined.

Expanding eastwards so quickly into what had long been Russia’s sphere of interest created the worst of all worlds. It rubbed Moscow’s nose in the dirt of its own ignominy, strained relations between Russia and NATO, alarmed Russia, which then threatened states like Georgia and Ukraine, in turn attracting Western anger. NATO expansion served to divide Europe all over again.

Some US observers are now saying that NATO never made a promise to Moscow that it would not expand. This is completely disingenuous; in multiple forums and on many occasions, Russia was told that NATO would not move eastwards.

Don’t misunderstand me: I am no admirer of Putin or his aggression. My students will know that I tend to favour the ‘Liberal’ school of thought in International Relations, which rejects a ‘power politics’ explanation. In this case however, and since 1998, I have joined with the ‘Realists’ who argue that expanding NATO was unnecessary: a “fateful error”, as George Kennan described it, and a “monumental failure of empathy” which is having ”profound strategic consequences”.

As Stephen Walt writes, the tragedy is that the current crisis “was avoidable…had the US and its European allies not succumbed to hubris, wishful thinking…Russia would probably never have seized Crimea, and Ukraine would be safer today." Another Realist writer, John Mearsheimer, bluntly calls the Ukraine crisis ‘the West’s fault’.

This needs to be remembered as we see this crisis unfolding.

A circle portrait of a man smiling into the camera. He has dark hair and eyes.

Associate Professor Andrew Bonnell
School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry

Dr Marianne Hanson is absolutely correct to draw attention to the crucial historical background of the current tension over the Russian-Ukrainian border. In particular, the expansion of NATO after the end of the Cold War and the failure of Western powers to seek to accommodate Russia’s security interests in a new European security framework. 

Putin no doubt remembers that in the early 1980s, some 2 million NATO troops faced over 1.6 million Soviet-led Warsaw Pact soldiers in two heavily armed camps in Europe. The Soviet Union had over 400,000 troops stationed in East Germany alone at the time of the Berlin Wall’s opening and the subsequent unification of West and East Germany. Putin himself was a KGB officer stationed in Dresden in East Germany during the late 1980s.  

At the time of German unification in 1990, it was widely understood that NATO would not seek to expand further East. After all, the Atlantic alliance had ostensibly been created to defend Western Europe from encroachments by the Soviet bloc, and in 1990, Gorbachev’s USSR was withdrawing from Central-Eastern Europe and dismantling the Warsaw Pact, leaving NATO without its original raison d’être

Since then, NATO has advanced more than 1000 kilometres to the East, deploying forces (albeit far smaller than those of the Cold War Era) not only in former Warsaw Pact allies of the USSR, but into former constituent republics of the Soviet Union itself.

The Russian-Ukrainian border is particularly sensitive given that Russia and Ukraine share a deeply entangled history of over one thousand years – both states claim common ancestry from a principality based on Kiev/Kyiv founded in the tenth century. Putin has put his own spin on this history in his speech prior to the current troop movements. The prospect of such a closely related neighbouring state, which includes significant pockets of Russian-speakers, adhering to a rival alliance would nonetheless have been difficult for any Russian regime to accept. 

At the same time, Putin’s actions on the Ukraine border are likely to be counter-productive, hardening anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine and elsewhere. 

Australia has no strategic or diplomatic weight in this region, but would presumably support any Western economic sanctions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaking at an event. Image: Global Panorama/Flikr

A middle-aged white man stands at a wooden lectern with two large, fluffy microphones in front of him, as he does a speech. There is a statue behind him with Russian writing on the base.