Opinion and analysis

Edited and designed by Michael Jones

Australian civilians have lived relatively worry-free of compulsory service in armed conflicts since former prime minister Gough Whitlam ended conscription in 1972 during the Vietnam War.

But as global conflicts continue to escalate and questions are raised about Australia's ability to defend itself amid a growing risk of war in the Indo-Pacific region, Contact posed the question to UQ experts: should Australia consider bringing back conscription to boost troop numbers?

Key points:

• Despite a growing risk of war in the Indo-Pacific region, compulsory military service would prove incredibly unpopular politically and would lack the broader social licence necessary to sustain it.
• The presence of modern technology such as drones and the possibilities offered by semi- and fully-autonomous battlefield weapons may reduce the need for very large armies.
• Any attempt to implement conscription would be subject to substantial controversy and testing against contemporary non-discrimination legislation and human rights standards.
• To meet future challenges, Australia will have to spend a greater proportion of its GDP on Defence and focus that spending on the areas of greatest challenge to Australian security – notably the protection of sea lines of communication and the management of smaller scale crises in the near region.

Successive Australian governments have recognised the inadequate size of Australia's Defence Force, and former prime minister Tony Abbott and Defence analyst Dr Alexey Muraviev have both recently floated the idea of a return to mandatory military service for school leavers.

While a return of conscription might seem unfathomable for many Australians who were sent to war or who narrowly avoided the Vietnam War draft (also known as the 'lottery of death') – and younger generations who have only known peacetime – mandatory military service is a reality in other parts of the world.

Many European countries still have mandatory military service – including Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece and Norway – while Denmark plans to conscript more people, including women, in the face of Russian threat.

Sweden, which has famously embraced 2 centuries of neutrality, will join NATO this year and Swedish citizens have been warned to prepare themselves for the possibility of war.

So, are Australian civilians really at risk of being called to duty? What are the legal challenges standing in the way of a return of conscription? And just how vulnerable is Australia as global conflicts rage on?

Dr Greta Nabbs-Keller
Associate Director Defence, Space and National Security, Research Partnerships
Senior Research Affiliate, Centre for Policy Futures

National service versus conscription

The debate over national service and conscription has long been a contentious one in Australia. Framed in terms of civic duty or promoted in response to perceived existential threats to the nation, the debate tends to peak in periods of heightened geopolitical uncertainty.

Although national service and conscription can be easily conflated, there are key differences. National service schemes do not necessarily have a military dimension and they are not always compulsory. National service may form part of broader civic missions ranging from environmental restoration, social assistance programs or disaster relief and recovery. The much-lauded US Peace Corps or the antecedent program of Australian Volunteers Abroad, for example, can be viewed as national service schemes. Established in 1961 and 1951 respectively, they became a valuable tool of soft diplomacy and a life-changing experience for those young Americans and Australians participating.

In contrast, conscription relates directly to compulsory military service. Throughout Australia’s post-Federation history, it has involved the deployment of young men to overseas theatres of conflict. In the face of Japanese expansionism in the Pacific, former prime minister John Curtin famously recalled Australian Divisions supporting Britain in the Middle East and restricted Australian conscripts to areas south of the equator including the East Indies, Pacific Islands and northern Australia. The conscription of young men through the Vietnam War ‘draft’, by comparison, proved a highly contentious decision for then-prime minister Robert Menzies and successive governments due to a broader lack of public support for the US-led war in Indochina. Currently, Australia does not have a compulsory national service scheme, but public debate may intensify particularly in the event of an armed conflict in the region.

What is the risk to Australia’s security?

Australia’s current security environment is far less benign than it was even just 5 years ago. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2023 Defence Strategic Review both recognised that the risk of war in the Indo-Pacific region had increased and that Australia faced reduced warning times of a regional armed conflict. Although current conflicts seem distant from its shores, Australia now contends with the flow-on economic and political costs of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a Middle East rent by vengeance, violence and destruction.

In Australia’s own region – the Indo-Pacific – shifts in the global balance of power are diminishing the international rules-based order and escalating strategic tensions. This is felt most acutely in the maritime domain, where acts of coercion and intimidation are making the South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan Strait regional flashpoints. Magnifying the impact of human competition and conflict, meanwhile is global climate change, resulting in an ever-growing human, economic and environmental toll from the intensity and frequency of naturally occurring disasters. Rapid advances in technology, moreover, including generative AI and autonomous systems, deliver both promise and peril for humanity. AI can achieve greater economic and environmental benefits, for example, but it also erodes objective truth and trust, with direct impacts for liberal democracies.

Indeed, the threat posed by online misinformation, disinformation and deep fakes to democracies is salient in 2024, which Time has badged the “ultimate election year”. National elections in 64 countries are framed by a global trend of democratic regression. The results of many election contests, including Russia, are a foregone conclusion for incumbents, while in key regional states like Indonesia and India, the ballots may represent healthy electoral democracies, but increasing illiberal ones.

Understanding our Defence capability

The November US election is the world’s most consequential ballot, based on US global economic and strategic primacy. But the possibility that Donald Trump may be re-elected as US President will have far reaching implications for global stability and security. For Australia, the prospect of a Trump victory risks undermining the Government’s flagship Defence capital project – the AUKUS Pillar I Nuclear Submarine Program. Based on Trump’s past erratic treatment of allies and apparent disregard for America’s democratic leadership both at home and abroad, the immense costs and commitment involved in AUKUS Pillar I at the expense of other capability priorities is a potent risk for current and future governments. The introduction of national conscription will not materially change any of these realities.

Growing strategic uncertainty has expanded the kinds of military capabilities that Australia sees as essential in the coming decades – more ships as part of an enhanced Naval surface fleet, nuclear-powered submarines, enhanced autonomy, long-range strike and a greater emphasis on supply chain security and sovereign capability. But the Australian Defence Force (ADF) remains relatively small by international standards. Numbering around 60,000 regular personnel (and 29,000 part-time Reserves) this contrasts with Indonesia’s 400,000 active personnel, the UK’s 142,000, and Japan’s 247,000. The ADF also faces ongoing problems of recruitment and retention spurred by changing demographics and a more buoyant labour market. ADF members can access more attractive salaries and conditions outside the ADF and the lifestyle holds less appeal now for service personnel and their partners. In this context, any program of forced military service is unlikely to be a viable solution to gaps in military capability and preparedness. More likely, it would distract the Government from the urgent need to accelerate Defence capability, uplift industry, and integrate advanced technologies.

In the absence of any precipitous deterioration in Australia’s immediate security environment, Australia should not reintroduce national military service. What is required perhaps is greater engagement with the public about the range of security challenges faced by Australia. There is also clearly a need for the girding of democratic principles, strengthening of social cohesion and a sense of greater individual responsibility to our communities and country. Drawing on former US President John F. Kennedy’s famous 1961 speech, “ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country,” engendering a sense of civic duty, respect for each other and our planet, is a good thing that can be promoted through non-compulsory national service schemes.

Associate Professor Sarah Percy
School of Political Science and International Studies

The evolution of conscription

The rise and fall (and in some cases, the rise again) of conscription tells a much longer story about militaries and how they are organised. In most countries, conscription was adopted in modern times in the 19th century, as part of a very significant centralisation of military functions by the state. Governments stopped using mercenary forces and private logistics providers, and the nature of war required increasingly large armies. Militaries needed soldiers and had to get large numbers of them: conscription was the solution.

But how could a modern government simply force its citizens to fight? The development of conscription is closely associated with the extension of voting rights in most European states. This was the bargain of conscription: fighting for your country gave you rights that many had not previously had. This relationship between conscription and democracy was so pronounced that it became a concern on both sides of the women’s suffrage debate. British and American women were concerned about how “bullets for ballots” would impact their right to vote. In France, where female providers of food and drink called cantinières worked in a quasi-military capacity on the battlefield until after the turn of the 20th century, authorities were only too aware that allowing them to continue to serve might bolster the case for women getting the vote. It was no coincidence that their services were cancelled as the movement for women’s suffrage took on greater momentum. However, the particular relationship between conscription (rather than just military service) and democracy was only dominant in continental Europe.

Conscription lasted in most European states through the 20th century because of the omnipresent threat of war. In the Anglosphere, there was a longstanding suspicion regarding conscription, and it was deployed on an emergency basis only. In fact, both Canada and Australia hotly debated conscription during World War I, with these nations struggling with the complexities of conscripting their men to fight a war overseas. After World War II, many countries (European and otherwise) kept a form of national service in place for a period. Outside continental Europe, most countries ceased the practice by the late 1950s, although some (such as the US) retained the ability to call for conscription if it was deemed necessary.

In Western Europe, most countries abandoned conscription through the 1990s and early 2000s. The exceptions are the Nordic countries. It is still rare to conscript men and women on an equal basis, even in countries where women are allowed to participate in combat. However, Norway conscripts both men and women, and Denmark has recently announced it will do the same. Israel has conscripted both men and women, but contrary to popular belief, women were not allowed to fight in the Israeli army until the 2000s. Countries at risk of war (or fighting it) often adopt or continue conscription – Russia and Ukraine both have conscription (as do many of the central Asian former Soviet states), and it is common throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

The future of war and need for mass armies

It's not clear that conscription is related to military readiness, however. The Nordic states have in general not been preparing for a specific war, but have retained conscription.

Finally, it’s not at all clear that future wars will be fought with mass armies that require conscription. The presence of modern technology such as drones and the possibilities offered by semi and fully autonomous battlefield weapons may reduce the need for very large armies. And history shows that in an emergency, states can quickly mobilise and train armies.

Dr Lauren Sanders
Senior Research Fellow
TC Beirne School of Law

Professor Rain Liivoja
Professor and Deputy Dean (Research)
TC Beirne School of Law

Australia’s legal approach to conscription is heavily influenced by its history with the issue, and the civil unrest it caused in previous conflicts. Plans to reintroduce conscription would likely attract significant legal controversy.

Legal history of conscription in Australia

A law passed in 1909 required all Australian men aged 19–60 to undertake compulsory military training, and to render ‘home defence’ in cases of war (meaning they could be required to serve inside Australia in times of war). During World War I – in 1916 and 1917 – 2 referendums were held, and lost, seeking to expand this requirement to serving overseas.

The issue arose again during World War II. Initially, all single men under 21 were liable to serve, but by 1942 this was extended to all men aged 18–35 and all single men aged 35–45. Again, they were only to render service in Australian territory (which included Papua New Guinea) and there were exemptions; including on medical grounds, education (such as medical students), religious grounds or family circumstances (such as only sons or those who cared for children). In 1943, new legislation allowed service outside Australian territory, but limited it to the Pacific.

The National Service Act 1951 (Cth) introduced an obligation for all men turning 18 to do 176 days of training, and then be liable to 5 years of service in the Reserves (during which time they could be called up). In 1964, this was changed to require all 20-year-old men whose birthday was called up in a ballot to serve for 2 years full time and 3 years in the Reserves. This was in response to heightened tensions with Indonesia and at the time was well supported.

The rules changed in response to the Vietnam War: the Defence Act 1965 allowed for conscripts to be sent to fight overseas. This attracted huge controversy, including challenges about the extent of conscientious objection, resulting in a High Court case in 1968. The case was ultimately decided in favour of the government: that the extent of conscientious objection is limited and does not extend to objecting to serve in a war which a person might object to on political grounds. Amid extensive anti-war and anti-conscription protests, the Whitlam Government ended this practice with the National Service Termination Act 1973 (Cth).

Is conscription still legal in Australia?

The rules that now apply mean that all persons aged 18–60, who have resided more than 6 months in Australia can be conscripted (in section 59 of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), last amended in 1992).

Before this can happen, the Governor-General needs to make a proclamation to call up those people to serve for the duration of the time of war, and both Houses of Parliament must approve the proclamation. If a proclamation is made, regulations need to be issued to establish a process to call people up and the criteria for service, which might look similar to the lists about who can and cannot serve – or who might be exempt – during World War II. There are also extensive rules that outline how conscientious objectors are assessed, through a process called Conscientious Objection Tribunals.

There is, generally, no limit on how these conscripts could be used. If called up, they could be ordered to serve in overseas conflicts, subject to some exceptions (again, largely related to conscientious objection). When they do serve, they are then subject to the lawful orders of their superiors within that military structure. Since 2019, the legal restriction on women serving in combat roles has also been removed, so any person conscripted could be liable to serve in any role.

The law requires members of the ADF (including conscripts) to be treated fairly, and there are guarantees relating to pay and compensation for harm incurred during service. Avenues of complaint, like the Redress of Grievance Scheme, the Defence Ombudsman and the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, are also in place.

Human rights challenges ahead

The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commissioner inquired into a situation arising out of the 1990 Gulf War, when a volunteer navy serviceperson (Jones) objected to deploying on the basis of a political and moral objection to the war. In spite of the Commissioner’s recommendations, Jones was subsequently court-martialled and sentenced to 21 days in detention.

Australia has signed on to most human rights treaties and enacted many more domestic human rights instruments since, and it is unclear how these rules might impact the process of conscription introduced into the Defence Act over 100 years ago. For example, limiting any compulsory military service to men would raise questions about discrimination of the basis of sex or gender. The Defence Act, where the relevant laws reside, is currently undergoing significant reform. Whether the law to conscript still features in the rulebook after this amendment remains to be seen.

Professor Alexander Bellamy
Director of Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
School of Political Science & International Studies

How vulnerable is Australia if war was declared?

Threats to international peace and security are increasing on multiple fronts, with significant implications for Australia. On almost every measure, our world is becoming less safe, and there is little sign of those trends reversing.

Most significant in that regard is the rise of China and the potential challenges that poses to the rules-based international order. China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, claims to Taiwan, and border disputes with India portend a region in which armed competition is more, rather than less, likely. China is also looking to extend its influence into the Pacific and beyond and to re-orient global institutions like the United Nations (UN) away from human rights and democracy promotion. In the future, that means Australia can expect to get less of what it wants from an organisation like the UN. As China strengthens its maritime capacities, it might start to threaten freedom of navigation in more parts of the region than it has already. As an island state, Australia has an obvious interest in maintaining that freedom and protecting the laws of the sea – laws that are currently being challenged by Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen.

Another major power, Russia, has already begun to aggressively expand its imperial reach into Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, directly challenging international rules and threatening the world order on which they are based. The danger here is that 2 major pillars of the UN system – China and Russia – have demonstrated an inclination to challenge fundamental aspects of that system.

Significant threats also stem from regional-level states like North Korea, whose missile program poses a direct threat to key allies like South Korea and Japan, and Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism that is pursuing its own nuclear ambitions. Although ISIS has been quietened for now, it’s barbarous ideology enjoys support in some places and violent jihadism remains a threat to life. In this environment, Australia depends for its security on the twin pillars of the UN system and its alliance with the US and associated partners (AUKUS, Japan, South Korea etc.).

At present, Australia is not well prepared for that future but, like most other democracies, it’s facing up to the fact that to meet future challenges it will have to spend a greater proportion of its GDP on Defence than has recently been the case, and to focus that spending on the areas of greatest challenge to Australian security – notably the protection of sea lines of communication and the management of smaller scale crises in the near region. Australia must also contributing its fair share to common endeavours such as the defence of allies and maintenance of maritime freedom. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Ukraine’s heroic defence, shows that despite the march of hi-tech warfare, there might still be a place for conscription in national Defence. In Ukraine, school teachers have become drone operators, professors have become intelligence analysts, and men and women from all walks of life have become effective frontline fighters.

Most Western governments, including Australia, continue to prefer wholly professional militaries, holding that only professional soldiers have the skills necessary to function effectively on the modern battlefield. That is likely true when opponents lack the scale to inflict large casualties, but in the future, challenges might come from military powers with greater capacity to inflict harm at a great scale, meaning that the trend towards smaller professional militaries and away from conscription may need to be re-thought, as some European states have already begun to do.

However, Australia’s position – surrounded by water and distance – means that its defence will likely prioritise naval, air, and missile technologies that can reach longer distances rather than shorter ranged land warfare. This means that it's unlikely there will be any military and strategic impetus for a return to conscription here for the foreseeable future. 

Law and the Future of War

The face of war is changing. Contemporary and potential future conflicts involve new domains of warfare, irregular actors, novel capabilities and new tactics.

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